UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES
3D MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN)
UNIT 44070
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From: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
To: Distribution List

Subj: 90 DAY AFTER ACTION REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Ref: (a) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines After Action Report for the
           Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration Phase in Support
           of Deployment to Afghanistan of 27 Nov 04
       (b) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines California Pre-deployment Training
           Program (PTP) deployment After Action Report of 2 Nov 04
       (c) 3d Battalion, 6th Marines After Action Report Presentation of
           24 Nov 04
       (d) 1st Battalion, 6th Marines After Action Report on Operations in
           Afghanistan, of 5 Aug 04
       (e) 2d Battalion, 8th Marines After Action Report Concerning Bagram
           Air Field, Afghanistan, of 17 Jan 04

Encl: (1) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines Report Matrix

1. The purpose of this report is to assist in the preparation of follow-on
units for operational deployment to the Afghanistan sub-theatre and to build
upon the lessons learned previously cited in references (a)-(e). This after
action report is presented ninety days after the Transfer of Authority (TOA)
with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines that took place on 25 November 2004, at which
time this Battalion assumed operational control for the Tactical Area of
Responsibility (TAOR) that was re-designated TAOR Trinity. The Battalion was
subsequently designated Combined Task Force (CTF) Trinity, part of CTF
Thunder whose command structure was sourced from 3d Field Artillery Brigade,
25th Infantry Division, USA. CTF Thunder is responsible for Regional Command
(RC) East comprised of the Eastern portion of Afghanistan, as part of the
Combined/Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76) whose command structure is sourced
from the 25th Infantry Division, USA. TAOR Trinity is composed of six Afghan
Provinces and is roughly the size of the state of West Virginia. In order to
meet the operational requirements in the assigned battle space, the Battalion
has organized into four maneuver companies and one provisional rifle company
that provides the guard and security force at one of the five Forward
Operating Bases (FOBs) occupied by task force units.

2. This report reflects after action comments, by warfighting function,
generated through ninety days of operating within the Combined/Joint
Operating Area (CJOA). It should be noted that a Pre-Deployment Site Survey
(PDSS) was conducted in August that was able to identify many of the unique
requirements for operating in this CJOA. The combination of the findings of
the PDSS and the efforts of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines; 3d Marine Regiment;
and 3d Marine Division, afforded the information and equipment necessary to
prepare the Battalion for this operating theatre.

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3. Command and Control

   a. Topic: Information Management

      (1) Discussion: In the current theatre, reporting requirements necessitate a detailed information management plan at the Battalion level. Managing the information flow through the Combat Operations Center (COC) has been challenging during the first 90 days in theater. On a weekly basis, the battalion staff submits seventy-four required reports to higher headquarters and company staffs submit seven required reports to the Battalion Staff. These numbers of required reports do not factor in the event driven reports that are generated through continued operations. To manage these requirements, a reporting matrix, enclosure (1), was created and disseminated.

      (2) Recommendation: Information management will continue to present a unique challenge to an infantry battalion staff. This complex challenge will be further complicated with the need to operate in an Alpha & Bravo command configurations for extended periods. Prior to conducting the transfer of authority, battalions should publish a reporting matrix that clearly defines all submission requirements. In order to effectively and efficiently manage/track the flow of information, it is recommended that the Battalion Staff prepare to sustain 24-hour operations with a watch officer, watch chief, and operations clerk in both the Alpha & Bravo Command Groups that have a clear understanding of all requirements. Additionally, a working understanding of C2PC, MCS Lite, Falcon View, and the entire Microsoft Office suite is required down to the company level.

   b. Topic: Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) channel

      (1) Discussion: The distributed battlefield in TAOR Trinity necessitates the use of satellite communications as primary means of command and control. Limitations on satellite access have forced all traffic onto a single TACSAT channel that is shared by the battalion, at all levels, and two separate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The battalion maintains five separate FOBs, each with subordinate units conducting continuous duration security operations outside the wire. Thus, at any given time ten different elements from within the battalion are reliant upon the single TACSAT channel as their primary means of communications. As a result, communications are often degraded through constant competition for airtime between all operating units.

      (2) Recommendation: Based on the necessity of distributed operations in TAOR Trinity and the reliance on satellite communications for command and control, it is recommended that a separate TACSAT channel be dedicated for specific battalion level operations. This method proved to be a reasonable work around during recent operations. In addition, strict adherence to proper communications procedures and the use of execution checklists with brevity codes can significantly reduce radio traffic on a taxed net.

4. Intelligence

   a. Topic: Intelligence Personnel

      (1) Discussion: Distributed operations throughout TAOR Trinity have presented some unique intelligence challenges. At each FOB, maneuver elements are conducting intelligence and targeting synchronization meetings

with all coalition agencies in the operating area, to include the PRT, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) elements, Other Government Organizations (OGA), and Other Coalition Forces (OCF). Company commanders develop an intelligence picture for their assigned area, coordinate with collection assets in order to support operations, and handle the processing of Enemy Combatants (EC's). To manage these intelligence requirements, a single intelligence analyst has been assigned to three of the four maneuver companies. This has left one company and one FOB without an analyst. At the battalion level, this has degraded the capabilities to produce intelligence products for battalion operations.

(2) Recommendation: In preparation for operations in this theatre, ensure all analysts are prepared to operate independently. To adequately provide intelligence support in this environment, an intelligence section staffed with eight Intelligence Analysts, one SNCOIC, and two Intelligence Officers is recommended.

b. Topic: Theatre Intelligence Database

(1) Discussion: Coalition forces have been operating in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom since late 2001. In the current operating theatre, numerous coalition and Afghanistan government agencies collect intelligence information daily. Intelligence sharing is currently achieved through accessing various task force websites and reading their individual reports. At the present time, a consolidated database accessible at the tactical level does not exist to facilitate the sharing of intelligence information and assessments. Consequently, information as basic as the reliability of sources or the names of certain villages has created unnecessary confusion.

(2) Recommendation: Timely and accurate intelligence drives operations. It is recommended that a consolidated intelligence database be developed for the Afghanistan sub-theatre that can be accessed at the task force level. A shared database, where all intelligence collection agencies and conventional ground forces enter their reports would enable all units to have a shared view. This shared database could maintain statistics on the reliability of sources so that tactical commanders using the intelligence would know how much credence to lend to it. The database could also be organized to allow the user to sort data chronologically by source or by geographic area. The minimum information required would include village locations/assessments, source reporting to include reliability, and current threat assessments.

5. Maneuver

a. Topic: Duration Security Operations

(1) Discussion: All maneuver elements have conducted combined duration security operations to defeat terrorist insurgency operations in TAOR Trinity with various Afghan government agencies. Operations have focused on enhancing Afghan self-governance, promoting the legitimacy of the Afghan national government and setting the conditions for successful parliamentary elections and the subsequent democratic processes. Leaders at all levels have continually interacted with village elders, mullahs, and educators to convey the Battalion's information operations message and to gain actionable human intelligence (HUMINT). To this point, the most effective way to develop this HUMINT has been through the conduct of duration security

operations lasting a minimum of four days in a particular location. Additionally Anti-Government Forces (AGF) will often attempt to initiate contact by the third or fourth day.

    (2) Recommendation: Operations through the first ninety days have indicated that local nationals appear to be more forthcoming with human intelligence after forces establish a duration presence. It is recommended that maneuver units conduct duration security operations, a minimum of four days in one location, to develop relationships, build trust and gain actionable human intelligence, and increases the chances of closing with the AGF.

   b. Topic: Aviation Operations

    (1) Discussion: The Aviator's Procedures Guide (APG) for Afghanistan defines the rules and regulations for helicopter flight operations in Afghanistan. Obtaining timely aviation support for deliberate operations has been more problematic. In Regional Command East, Task Force (TF) Wings provides aviation support for CTF Thunder, CJSOTF, and other agencies/task forces. There are approximately twenty-three assault transport helicopters in TF Wings. Of the twenty-three helicopters, six are CH-53E, nine are CH-47, and eight are UH-60 aircraft. In CTF Thunder exclusively, there are approximately 4,000 personnel. TF Wings is responsible for supporting the ring flights, a theatre Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and the Afghanistan Government. Only after these missions are fulfilled are aircraft available for deliberate operations. Because of the limited number of assets available for deliberate operations, the helicopters become a high-demand, low-density item. Given the lead-time required to request helicopter support, it is very difficult, and at times infeasible, to respond to real-time, actionable intelligence. Consequently, the limited aviation assets available for deliberate operations often inhibit the commander's ability to rapidly build-up combat power in and around an objective area. The limited number of aircraft also restricts the ability to plan for contingencies. Not all areas in TAOR Trinity are accessible by ground vehicles therefore helicopter utilization is a must. Also, disposition of helicopters within the operating theatre presents a problem with CASEVAC in the northern provinces within TAOR Trinity, where response time from notification to arrival at a level-two medical treatment facility is over two-hours. With the current number of helicopters available for deliberate operations it is unrealistic to sustain operational tempo greater than that of the AGF. Additionally, co-locating all rotary wing assets at BAF, an area very susceptible to prohibitive weather, often prevents aircraft from operating in more temperate areas where weather conditions are more conducive to flight operations.

    (2) Recommendation: The minimum number of helicopters available for deliberate operations in RC East is a long-term problem. The ideal solution is to increase the number of helicopters in RC East. In the short term, staging helicopters at the Jalal Abad Airfield (JAF), in Nangahar Province, would decrease the CASEVAC time, in the northern Provinces of TAOR Trinity, to closer to the one-hour turn around from notification until arrival at a level-two treatment facility. Another option that could be explored is to allocate a Joint Air Ground Task Force that is dedicated to tactical employment with a supporting task force for logistics and sustainment.

   c. Topic: Interaction With The Afghan Population

      (1) Discussion: Our foremost asset in this theater has been the friendship of the Afghan people. They afford us the greatest protection from those who would do us harm and provide the intelligence we need to locate and destroy AGF. Every interaction we have with the Afghan people has been one where we emphasize that we are here to help them. We take proactive measures to build trust and friendship with the Afghans, and have worked hard to overcome our language and cultural barriers. Our goal is to cultivate positive relationships that will produce HUMINT and deny the AGF the support of the Afghan people. Paramount to this effort is being able to effectively communicate. During PTP the Battalion focused on learning Dari because Dari is the official language that all Afghans are supposed to know. We found however, that the primary language in TAOR Trinity is Pashtun. While Dari is spoken in some places, most locals speak and understand Pashtun. Nuristani is also spoken in the northern most portion of the TAOR.

      Another important aspect of interacting with the Afghans is the proper use of interpreters. When used effectively, interpreters are a tremendous combat multiplier in a Stability and Support Operation (SASO) environment. We have leveraged our Category One (CAT I) interpreters, who are not cleared for secret information, at every level of Battalion operations. At the squad level, patrols have effectively used interpreters to communicate with as many people as possible during village duration presence missions and local security patrols. Interpreters play an integral part at the Company and Battalion level while developing relationships with local leaders, mullahs and elders or planning combined operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 04-7 "Interpreter Operations Handbook," has many valuable tips for working with interpreters. Two valuable lessons learned have been: (1) Talk to the person you are speaking with and not to the interpreter. (2) Ensure the interpreter is translating the entire conversation rather than paraphrasing or summarizing either side of the conversation.

      (2) Recommendation: As with operating in any foreign country, the key to effectively communicating with the Afghan populace has been identifying commonalities and building a relationship founded on trust. Treat the Afghan people with respect, show an interest in the Afghan language, and learn how to interact through interpreters. Units operating in TAOR Trinity should focus primarily on Pashtun. Learning basic words and phrases quickly breaks down boundaries and greatly assists in relationship building.

   d. Topic: Police Training

      (1) Discussion: If Afghanistan is ever to make the transition from martial law to civil law, it is imperative that the local police be perceived by the populace as fair and competent. A key aspect of our SASO mission has been the professional development of Afghan National Police (ANP) forces. We are working throughout TAOR Trinity to increase the capabilities and credibility of the local ANP forces. We conduct significant numbers of joint patrols with the ANP, training with them and include them in as many of our operations as operational security will allow. It is important that these crucial forces are manned, trained and equipped to perform their duties. We are working to standardize this training throughout the TAOR to ensure uniformity and consistency. One element that has proven to be challenging is the varying levels of experience and skill sets within the Battalion to conduct this training. There are unique law enforcement and security

techniques that are not normal Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Tasks (METs).

    (2) Recommendation: It would be beneficial to learn the basics of security force operations and policing techniques during the PTP. If possible, local Police agencies and Military Police could teach a basic course to all Officers, SNCOs and NCOs. This course should cover techniques for establishing a beat, interviewing techniques, investigative tools and techniques, making arrests, processing personnel and evidence, and other police specific Mission Essential Tasks. Additionally at least one Military Police (MP) Marine/Soldier should be attached to each company in order to provide instructor expertise.

    e. Topic: Convoy Operations

    (1) Discussion: Prior to deployment, the Battalion conducted all ground convoys as if they were combat operations. This included movement to and from training areas, as well as logistical movements. This is essential training in preparing for deployment to Afghanistan. Each Company had the opportunity to conduct the live-fire convoy course during the Revised Combined Arms Exercise (RCAX) at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center. The convoy course focused primarily on the use of the 7-ton, Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), but not the high back HMMWV, which has proven to be our primary troop transport vehicle in theater. The roads in Afghanistan are limited and most are extremely dangerous. In some of the mountainous terrain within our TAOR, 7-Tons cannot be driven because they are too wide for the narrow roads. Also, there are many switchbacks that require drivers to execute 3-point turns and there is very little room to maneuver due to high cliffs and drop-offs. Convoy movement is terrain dependent and in most areas travel speeds are reduced, favoring vehicle safety versus security. As a result of the severely restrictive terrain, the Battalion has relied heavily on our HMMWVs and Army Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTV) for tactical mobility. LMTVs have been attached to our companies and our Marines are cross-trained on operating them.

    (2) Recommendation: The PTP should include as many tactical convoy operations as possible. Each road movement should be treated as a combat operation to include the following: convoy brief, terrain model, rehearsals, immediate action drills, back brief, and pre-combat inspection. All drivers should receive additional training in night driving aided by Night Vision Goggles and familiarity with the effects of In-fared headlights. Units should qualify as many drivers as possible through the Motor Vehicle Operators School prior to getting into theatre. All 7-Ton drivers and experienced HMMWV drivers should conduct cross training on Army LMTVs and have documentation put in their training records. Finally, all Drivers, Assistant-Drivers and Vehicle Commanders should be extensively trained in tactical vehicle recovery techniques.

6. Fires

    a. Topic: Kinetic Fires

    (1) Discussion: The establishment of fire support coordination centers (FSCC), at both the company and battalion levels has presented unique challenges. Since Weapons Company is operating as a maneuver company, the Artillery Liaison Officer assumed the duties as the Battalion Fire Support Coordinator (FSC). The FSCC is comprised of the Artillery Liaison Section

and the 81mm Platoon Sergeant. Distributed operations throughout TAOR Trinity required each individual company to establish and staff their own FSCC to de-conflict fires within their assigned TAOR. Multiple units operate and transit the Company/Battalion TAOR on a daily basis. Cross-boundary fires are part of normal operations and often requested/observed by Afghan forces with U.S. advisors.

(2) Recommendation: It has been a challenge to organize, train, and implement a FSCC at the company level. We recommend that Companies prepare for this challenge by incorporating fire support coordination training into their PTPs. At the Battalion level, we recommend that the FSC be staffed with the Artillery Liaison Officer, Artillery Liaison Chief, and 81mm Platoon Sergeant. All three individuals should prepare to assume the duties of the Battalion FSC, which will create the flexibility for one of the three to travel to each company's TAOR to ensure proper procedures are implemented.

    b. Topic: Non-Kinetic Fires

(1) Discussion: Information Operations (IO) in Afghanistan has been vital to winning the support of the local population. Although IO Training was conducted as part of our PTP, we limited the training to a designated group of SNCOs and Officers, where we would have benefited from a more comprehensive training package with a greater target audience. One of the first initiatives of the Battalion after the transfer of authority was to create an Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) in order to develop and implement the non-kinetic fire support plan. This intra-task force working group is comprised of: the Information Operations Officer (U.S. Marine Corps Individual Augment), the Artillery Liaison Officer, Civil Affairs Officer (U.S. Army attachment), Tactical PSYOP Team Representative (U.S. Army attachment), Combat Camera Representative (U.S. Marine Corps attachment), and Combat Correspondent (U.S. Marine Corps attachment). The IOWG's initial challenge was to develop a focused, coherent, and comprehensive Information Operations campaign that integrated the company commanders' area specific requirements and initiatives. The primary objective of non-kinetic fires has been to produce actionable intelligence that leads to locating and removing Coalition Forces targets and preempts or disrupts AGF activities. Non-kinetic fires have targeted both friendly and neutral Afghan leaders to include Government Officials, the ANP, village elders, mullahs, educators, and the AGF. An important IO tool is the Commander's Emergency Response Projects (CERP) funding. CERP projects provide the commander with a means to provide immediate assistance to the Afghan people through small reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance distributions. These projects and associated civil military operations specifically target assessed "red" security districts to gain the trust and confidence of the local Afghan populace. This attention builds a mutual trust that in turn produces HUMINT. Other tools implemented include PSYOP flyers, posters, radio broadcasts, press conferences, and providing all Marines with appropriate talking points. The effects from non-kinetic fires are measured through the identification and turn-in of weapons caches, un-exploded ordnance, improvised explosive devices and components, and information that leads to the capture of AGF leaders.

(2) Recommendation: It is critical for maneuver units to embrace Information Operations and facilitate training prior to deployment down to the platoon level. We recommend that Battalions implement and use an IOWG to focus information operations efforts and resources on influencing key Afghan leaders and to track and measure the effects of their non-kinetic fires. The

efforts of the IOWG have been essential to the successes of the Battalion and
it should be noted that every member of the IOWG is an attachment/augment to
the task force.

7. Logistics

    a. Topic: Intra-Theatre Transportation and Movement

        (1) Discussion: There have been a number of challenges transporting
personnel, supplies, parts, gear, and equipment throughout TAOR Trinity.   The
main logistical and transportation base for the theatre of Afghanistan is
Bagram Air Facility (BAF).   BAF is located north and west of TAOR Trinity and
within two days drive of all forward operating bases occupied by the
Battalion's forces.   There are two main modes of transportation that
facilitate the movement of personnel, supplies, parts, gear, and equipment.
First, Host Nation contracted ground transportation is available through the
local economy and are commonly referred to as "jingle trucks".   The jingle
truck companies are generally based out of the capital city of Kabul and have
periodically proven unreliable to deliver supplies in a timely manner.   This
mode of transportation is used primarily to deliver supplies and non-
serialized items to the FOBs.   Second, "Ring Flights" originate from BAF and
fly pre-determined routes that are designated by color.   Scheduled ring
flights hit every FOB at least every eight days.   Requests to transport both
gear and cargo via ring flights must be manifested 96-hours in advance.   Both
modes of logistical transportation are very susceptible to inclimate weather
and we have experienced numerous delays as a result.   To effectively manage
and control the large volume of logistics being pushed from BAF, the
Battalion was augmented with a Deployed Unit Support Team (DUST) from CSSG-3
prior to arrival in theatre.   The DUST operates from BAF, and is in
continuous communication with the Battalion's Logistics and Air Officers.
The DUST has proven invaluable.

        (2) Recommendation: In order for units to operate within the intra-
theatre transportation constraints, they need to be prepared to staff
appropriate personnel at BAF.   These personnel should be task organized to
manage all classes of supply, mail, and the flow of personnel both inter and
intra-theatre.

   b. Topic: Prepositioned Supply and Maintenance Items at FOBs.

        (1) Discussion: Due to the lack of a consistently reliable means to
conduct rapid and timely resupply, it is imperative to develop a supply stock
of class I, III, V, VIII and IX at each FOB.   Companies must have readily
available sources of essential operating items such as food, water, fuel,
medical supplies and ammunition in order to conduct immediate resupply to
units in the field.   All other classes of supply can be moved forward with
jingle trucks and on scheduled aviation ring routes.   One of the most
important aspects of pre-positioning supplies is ensuring that adequate
levels of repair parts for motor transport and armory assets are available.
Pre-expendable bins (PEB) have proven absolutely essential to reducing the
maintenance turn around time from several weeks to just days.   Another
important element of reducing maintenance turn around times has been the task
organization of second and third echelon maintainers down to the company
level.   Having mechanics and technicians at the company level has almost
eliminated the necessity to evacuate assets to the rear for inspection and
maintenance.

     (2) Recommendation: Units must plan for and continue to preposition adequate stocks of supplies and maintenance PEBs forward, to support the rapid fulfillment of logistical requirements independent of transportation limitations. It is highly recommended to task organize second and third echelon maintainers at the company level.

8. Point of contact is Assistant Operations Officer, Capt C.B. Kroll, at DSN: 318.851.0139 or via email SAL.MAR.S3A@CJTF76.centcom.smil.mil.

                                   N. L. COOLING

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3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES REPORT MATRIX

S-3 RESPONSIBILITIES

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
Weekly Roll-up	0400Z Saturday	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Weekly Cache Report	0830Z Thursday	S-3	Thunder ENGR	SIPR Net	
IWS Slides	0830Z Thursday	S-3	Thunder TOC	IWS	
Daily OPSUM	0900Z Daily	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Daily Sitrep	0500Z Daily	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
UpArmor Report	0500Z Daily	S-3	MARCENT	SIPR Net	
Daily Fires Report	0500Z Daily	TRINITY FIRES	Thunder Fires Cell	SIPR Net	
COAB Slides	0900Z 5th of every month	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Repatriation Report	0830Z 1st of every month	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	

S-1 RESPONSIBILITIES

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
PERSTAT	0500Z Daily	S-1	Thunder S1	SIPR Net	
SJA Activity Report	1200Z Thursday	S-1	Thunder SJA	NIPR/SIPR	

S-2 RESPONSIBILITIES

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
INTSUM	2200Z Daily	S-2	Thunder S2	SIPR Net	
Allegiance Program	0900Z Friday	S-2	Thunder S2	SIPR Net	

S-4 RESPONSIBILITIES

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
LOGSTAT	0700Z Daily	S-4	Thunder S4	SIPR Net	

S-6 RESPONSIBILITIES

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
Communications Status Report	0500Z Daily	S-6	Thunder S6	SIPR Net	

BRIEFS

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
Commander's Nightly Update Brief (CNUB)	1245Z Daily	Trinity 6	Thunder 6	TACSAT 999	
Battle Space Update Brief (BUB)	1300Z Mon-Thur, Sat.	Trinity LNO	Thunder 6	Brief	
IWS (Internet Tele-Conference)	1130Z Saturday	Trinity6/5/3	Thunder 6	IWS	

S-3 EVENT DRIVEN

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
Situation, Activity, Location, Time (SALT)	10 mins from initial contact	S-3	Thunder TOC	Pri: MIRC Alt1: TACSAT 016 Alt 2: Phone	
Update, Remarks (SALTUR)	2 hrs from initial contact	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Operation Summary (OPSUM)	2 hrs from initial contact	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Cache/ UXO Report	2 hr from initial notification	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Narcotics Report	2 hr from initial notification	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
IED Report	2hr after notification lines 1-8, 11 and 13 are due. 24 hr after notification complete report is due.	S-3	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	
Air Strike Requests	As needed	AIR O	Thunder Fires Cell	SIPR Net	
Air Mission Request Form	As needed	AIR O	Thunder TOC	SIPR Net	

COMPANY REPORTS

Report	Time	From	To	Method	Remarks
Daily Report	0300Z	Co	Bn	SIPR Net	